Aemaet
Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie
Natural and Artificial Family
Planning: Some minor
additions to Dietrich von
Hildebrand’s defense of
Humanae Vitae∗
A Dialogue
Fritz Wenisch∗∗
2018
∗The dialogue is a continuation of conversations that can be found
in Fritz Wenisch, Is Faith in the Gospels Irrational? (see footnote 1).
The Text is available under the Creative Commons License Attribu-
tion 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) Publication date: 23.08.2018.
∗∗Fritz Wenisch was born in Austria and studied philosophy at the
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About two months after their wedding, Deb and Tom vis-
ited me in my office - a little over two years after I had
had extensive discussions with them.1 I told them that I
had found their wedding ceremony at Grace Church mov-
ing and beautiful, and that the reception at the Hope
Estates had been delightful. They smiled. It was obvi-
ous that they were very happy. Tom said, “Maybe as a
Catholic, you think that we are not really married, but
only living together.” He grinned wryly. I replied, “To
me, it sounded as if you really meant what you said when
you promised that you would be together ‘till death do
us part.”’
“Yes, we meant it,” said Tom, smiled at Deb,
took her hand, and she said, “We belong together forever.”
Tom added, “Forever and ever and ever and ever and then
some.” Deb poked him, laughing. I asked, “And did you
intend to have children?”
“Yes,” they exclaimed simul-
taneously without hesitation. “Well,” I replied, “then, the
University of Salzburg under Balduin Schwarz, a student of Dietrich
von Hildebrand. Since 1971, he is a member of the Department of
Philosophy at the University of Rhode Island in Kingston, Rhode
Island. Epost: fwenisch@XYZ (replace ‘XYZ’ by ‘@uri.edu’) Mail:
Department of Philosophy - University of Rhode Island - Kingston,
RI 02881 - USA
1Knowing the content of these conversations (Fritz Wenisch, Is
Faith in the Gospels Irrational? A Dialogue with an Agnostic, Irving
- Gaflei - Granada: International Academy of Philosophy Press,
2016.) is not presupposed at all for understanding any of the consid-
erations presented in this dialogue; but it will probably not surprise
you that I, as the author, recommend that you acquire the book
anyway. It is available through Amazon.com and Amazon.de.
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Fritz Wenisch
Catholic Church considers you as validly married.” They
smiled again. After they had told me a bit about their
honeymoon and after some small-talk, Tom said. . . (From
now on, “T” stands for “Tom,” “D” for “Deb,” and “F”
for “Fritz”):
T: During my years as a student, if I’d have had a chance
to talk people out of Catholicism, I would have in-
tended to talk them out of Christianity altogether.
Now, however, I am tempted to try talking you out
of Catholicism and into the small Evangelical de-
nomination to which Deb and I belong. There are, of
course, many other Evangelical denominations just
as valid as ours; but according to what our minister
pointed out when he prepared me for my baptism
and when he gave us marriage instructions, Catholi-
cism is caught up in a number of quite fundamental
errors. Don’t you remember that absolutely obvious
example he mentioned during our marriage prepar-
ation, Deb?
D: You mean what he told us about birth control?
T: Precisely.
F: Well, what did he say?
D: He spoke, of course, forcefully out against abortion
and warned us that some so-called birth control meth-
ods are abortifacients, preventing the implantation
of a fertilized ovum, which he designated as the
moral equivalent of abortion during early stages of
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pregnancy. He explained, however, that there is
absolutely nothing wrong with birth control meth-
ods that simply prevent fertilization. Naturally, he
also emphasized that married couples have the re-
sponsibility to raise children, in accordance with Gn
1.29, where God commands the first human couple
to “be fertile and multiply”; but he said that this
does not mean that a couple must have more chil-
dren than they can reasonably take care of. And
then. . . then. . .
T: Well, let me “jump in” here; Deb seems to be hesitant
to tell you that he pointed out an obvious mistake
in Roman Catholic teaching. This was, by the way,
not the only time he came across as highly critical
of Catholicism; I think he was concerned that our
conversations with you had attracted us too much to
your form of Christianity. Your church allows what
is called “natural family planning,” does it not?
F: Yes; it consists in determining the relatively few days
during a woman’s cycle during which she can con-
ceive and abstaining from the conjugal act during
these days.
T: And what is the goal of natural family planning?
F: To make sure that the woman does not conceive a child
- at least not at the time during which that family
planning method is practiced.
T: Isn’t this exactly the same goal one pursues through
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so-called artificial birth control?
F: Yes.
T: So there are two procedures which have exactly the
same goal and which, if carried out successfully, also
will lead to exactly the same result. As our minister
pointed out, it is more than strange for a Christian
denomination to approve of one of these procedures,
while forbidding the other. It strikes me similar to
you telling me, “You are not allowed to enter my
room if you come from the direction of the depart-
ment secretary’s office, but you are allowed to enter
if you come from the opposite direction of the hall-
way.” Unless you can point at something negative -
such as dirt on the hallway floor in the direction of
the secretary’s office, dirt which might stick to my
shoes and which I might carry into your office if I
come from that side, this directive would be com-
pletely arbitrary. I must agree with my pastor that
the Catholic directives about birth control make just
as little sense. What can you say except for admit-
ting that the command not to use artificial birth
control is just as arbitrary as you telling me, “Never
enter my room when you come from the direction of
the secretary’s office”?
F: First, I would recommend that you read Dietrich von
Hildebrand’s relatively short work, Love, Marriage,
and the Catholic Conscience - Understanding the
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Church’s Teaching on Birth Control.2 Here is a copy
of it - you are welcome to borrow it.
T: And second?
F: You seem to imply that there is no moral difference
between two modes of procedure if their outcome is
the same.
T: I am not only implying this, but I am explicitly saying
that it is so.
F: Then think of the following example: A man - the
father of five children - is in the hospital with a ser-
ious heart disease. He will die unless he receives a
heart transplant. His death would be an unspeak-
able tragedy for his family. A single man is brought
to the hospital after a serious car accident. An agree-
ment to be an organ donor signed by him is on file.
He dies as a consequence of the accident, and his
heart saves the life of the father of five.3
What do
2Manchester, NH: Sophia Institute Press, 1998. Originally pub-
lished in German, entitled Die Enzyklika “Humane Vitae” - ein
Zeichen des Widerspruchs
(Regensburg: Habbel,
1968).
Sub-
sequently, the work was published in English, translated by John
Crosby and Damian Fedoryka, entitled, The Encyclical “Humanae
Vitae” - A Sign of Contradiction (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press,
1969). The Sophia Institute Press edition also contains a reprint of
Pope Paul VI’s encyclical Humanae Vitae.
3This example presumes, of course, that the organ spender really
has died. Whether so-called ‘brain death’ is sufficient in that context
is, of course, more than questionable.
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you think of this? Was what the physicians did ap-
propriate?
T: I would feel sorry for the man who died; but obviously,
what was done was appropriate.
F: Allow me now to change the example a little. It is
very likely that the single man who is brought to
the hospital seriously injured will die, but there is
no absolute certainty - maybe he will survive. The
heart for the transplant is, however, needed imme-
diately, or else, the father of five will die. The single
man is, as an organ donor, eminently compatible
with the father. The physician goes ahead with the
transplant operation, thereby saving the life of the
father of five, but causing the death of the other, jus-
tifying his action by saying, “The other man would
likely have died anyway in day or two.” What do
you think of his conduct?
T: It would be terrible.
F: But does it, in the end, not have exactly the same out-
come as the physician’s action in the first example?
The single man is dead, and the life of the father of
five children has been saved.
T: Yes, but. . .
F: Does a comparison of these examples not show that
looking at the final outcome of instances of conduct
is not sufficient to determine whether or not the con-
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duct is morally acceptable? Do they not show that
other factors also must be taken into consideration?
Is there anything that comes to mind in the heart
transplant examples?
D: I would say that every human being, including someone
who likely will die in a short while, has a right to life,
that this right is violated in the second case, but not
in the first; that this makes the physician’s conduct
acceptable in the first case, but unacceptable in the
second.
F: A good answer, Deb. Do you agree, Tom?
T: I agree; but I do not see how on earth this can be
applied to the difference between natural and artifi-
cial birth control, unless you assume a right to life
prior to a person’s conception; that is, prior to his or
her existence. Are you now going to say that such
a right exists? And even if it did - which I don’t
agree with - I still would not see how natural birth
regulation would be less of a violation of this right
than artificial birth control.
F: Don’t worry; I am not going to argue that someone
who does not even exist has any rights. All the ex-
ample is meant to make clear is that looking at the
final outcome of human actions is not sufficient for
determining the moral property of what has been
done - whether it is right or wrong. This is, of
course, not to deny that the outcome of human con-
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duct is one of the factors - actually, a very import-
ant factor - which must be taken into consideration;
but other factors also must be looked at. Might it
not now be the case that there are factors besides
the identical final outcome that make natural family
planning morally acceptable, while contributing to
the moral unacceptability of artificial birth control?
T: Good luck with convincing us that there are such factors.
I cannot see any, and I think Deb is on my side. Deb?
D: I cannot see any either.
T: Well, during our conversations several years ago, you
and Deb occasionally “ganged up” on me; now, it’s
the two of us against you.
F: So let’s see what I can do against a two-thirds majority.
Both of you can probably list many things for which
you ought to be grateful - let’s call them “goods.”
Can you list some?
T: That I graduated with a high grade point average, that
I am healthy, that I have a well-paying job, that my
boss is friendly with me, that we have enough food,
that we are able to visit you - and one of the greatest
goods: That I met Deb, that we love each other, and
that we are now married. My dear, dear Deb! (He
briefly placed his arm around her shoulders.)
D: My dearest Tom!
F: Saying that I am very, very happy for you is the under-
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statement of the century. - Many other items could
probably be added to your list. The group of goods
can now divided into two subgroups which overlap.
First, there are things which are in a person’s true
interest.4
Health, enough food, or a place to live
are examples. Second, there are things which are in-
trinsically precious, the existence of which is better
than their non-existence, which enrich the world.5
I am sure, Tom, you would agree that Deb is an
example belonging in this second group.
T: Would I ever!
F: From this example, you can see that the two groups of
goods overlap: Was it not in your best interest that
she came into your life?
T: What an understatement!
F: Here is another overlap example: I guess that in the
not-too-distant future, you will have your first child
- an intrinsically precious object (remember that
philosophers do not intend to “objectify” things in
a negative way when they call them “objects,” but
4This is what Dietrich von Hildebrand calls “objective goods for
the person.”
5This is what von Hildebrand calls objects endowed with “values.”
In this context, it is important to note that Von Hildebrand considers
the fact that a person enjoys an objective good as a value; thus,
every action providing an objective good to someone else is an action
through which a value is realized. See Dietrich von Hildebrand,
Ethics (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1992), p. 91.
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that they apply that term to everything that is or
can be thought of). But having that child will also
be in your best interest - it will give you much joy
and happiness.
Do you think that it is reasonably clear to you what
is meant by “good”?
T: I think so. How about you, Deb?
D: I think so too, Tom, my most precious good.
F: Allow me now to call attention to another important
distinction between two types of goods. Consider
goods like health, enough food, and a place to live.
Imagine a person from whose life one of these goods
is missing. Would that not be negative?
T: Yes, it would - lack of health (i.e. sickness), food (i.e.
starvation) and homelessness are negative.
F: Thus, there are goods the absence of which is an evil.
D: Isn’t it like this with all goods?
F: Do you have siblings?
D: Yes, there are five of us - I have four older brothers.
F: So you are the youngest in the family.
D: Yes.
F: This means, of course, that you do not have a younger
sister.
D: No, I don’t.
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F: But if you had one, would she not be precious as a
human being, an enrichment to the universe, a great
good?
D: Yes.
F: But she does not exist - she is absent.
D: True.
F: Is her absence an evil?
D: No.
F: Thus, there are goods the absence of which is not an
evil. Before making an important qualification to
what I just said, let me use another example: Would
it not be great if next week, you could go on a two-
week vacation to Salzburg? Just look at the picture
up there on the wall.
D: What a beautiful town!
F: Well, how about visiting it for two weeks? Would it
not be wonderful if next week, you could start your
trip?
T: It would be wonderful.
F: But it will not work out, will it?
T: No, we do not have time off from our work - plus we
could not afford it; we need to save for the down
payment of the house we intend to buy.
F: I take it, though, that during the next two weeks, you
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will be happy anyway - happy with each other, with
the things you will do together, maybe even with
your work - hopefully at least.
T: You are right.
F: Thus, this trip to Salzburg is another example of a
good the absence of which is not an evil. We must,
therefore, distinguish goods the absence of which is
an evil from goods the absence of which is not an
evil. Health, a place to live, eyesight, or being able
to hear belong into the first group; Deb’s younger
sister and your trip to Austria belong to the second
group.
In order to avoid misunderstandings, let me return
to the qualification I postponed before: I take it,
Tom, that you were reasonably happy at URI prior
to meeting Deb?
T: Now, I cannot even imagine life without her; but true,
I had a wonderful time at URI, being away from
home, being on my own, hanging out with my friends
(except for the first four or five weeks - they were
kind of hard on me).
F: That’s the usual freshmen experience. That Deb entered
your life was a great good for you; but as you just
implied, her absence was not an evil.
T: You are right.
F: But now, losing her would be a great evil.
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T: That would be terrible! Don’t even talk about it!
F: Thus, when we speak of goods the absence of which is
not an evil, we have in mind situations in which the
good was never present; the loss of a good is always
an evil, even if prior to the good’s presence, no evil
was experienced.
That can also be illustrated with Deb’s younger sis-
ter whom she never had. Suppose your parents would
have had a sixth child. That would surely have been
possible, would it not?
D: Yes.
F: What if the child had died when she was two years
old? How would you have responded?
D: With great sadness.
F: But suppose someone would have stated, “What are
you sad about? You did not miss your little sister
three years ago, and the situation only has reverted
to how it was then.”
D: That would have not been helpful, and a very silly
thing to say.
F: Thus, it is hopefully clear by now that the absence of
a good’s not being an evil cannot be transferred to
the loss of that good; it applies only to the situation
prior to the good’s existence. On the other hand,
there are goods the absence of which is an evil even
if they never were present - such as eyesight, being
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free of brain damage, or a human’s having two legs.
Is it now not possible to carry out actions through
which we provide goods to others?
T: Yes. Whenever we help someone else who experiences
difficulties, we perform such an action.
F: Let’s consider briefly actions through which we provide
to others a good the absence of which is an evil (as
you will see, our main topic will be actions contrib-
uting to the coming about of a good the absence of
which is not an evil).
Suppose you see an injured person by the side of the
road; it is clear that he needs immediate medical
attention, you are the only one around and could
easily bring him to the hospital, but you ignore him.
D: Tom would never do that.
F: I know - but suppose someone would.
D: That would be terrible.
F: So you are saying that Tom would be obligated, duty
bound, to bring the injured man to the hospital.
D: Yes, that’s what I am saying.
F: Bringing him to the hospital is providing him with a
good the absence of which is an evil, is it not?
D: Yes.
F: Thus, the example shows that in many cases, there is
a duty to perform actions bringing about goods the
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absence of which is an evil. True?
D: I agree; and I am sure Tom does, too.
T: Yes, I do.
F: Moreover, the duty constitutes itself simply from the
encounter with the evil; no promise to help another
or a command by a legitimate authority or an oblig-
ation stemming from having signed a contract need
to enter the picture.
T: Agreed - when we encounter evils, we have a duty to
provide the good the absence of which results in the
evil we encounter.
F: Be careful; don’t generalize hastily. Suppose, Deb,
one of Tom’s coworkers is in danger of going totally
blind, his eyesight could be preserved only by a cornea
transplant, and Tom would be the perfect cornea
donor. Would he be duty bound to give up one of
his eyes so that the coworker’s sight can be preserved
in at least one eye?
D: If Tom would do so, this would be a very noble act -
but no, he would not be obligated.
F: It would go beyond the call of duty. Thus, we can see
that not all actions providing goods the absence of
which is an evil are obligatory. Determining the con-
ditions under which such a duty exists is an intric-
ate task; let’s not go into it, though, because for our
topic - birth control - actions bringing about goods
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the absence of which is not an evil are important.6
Imagine the following scenario: I know you had a
beautiful honeymoon, although you had to make
sure that it was not too expensive. Suppose the
thought had occurred to me to finance for you a
two-week trip to Austria, beginning, of course, in
Salzburg, but also including Vienna and several other
beautiful Austrian towns. Would not financing this
trip for you have been an action bringing about a
good the absence of which is not an evil?
D: It would have been wonderful - but no, its absence
was not an evil; although we did not spend our hon-
eymoon in Austria, it was truly beautiful.
T: You can say that again!
F: Would I have been obligated to finance that trip for
you?
D: Of course not.
F: Does that not show that, if all that I observe is that I
can bring about a good the absence of which is not
an evil, I have no duty to do so?
6A detailed discussion of this “intricate task” can be found in
Fritz Wenisch, “To Do or not To do. . . Basic Elements of an Ethics
of Actions,” in Aletheia - An International Yearbook of Philosophy,
Vol. VII (Bern: Peter Lang, 2002), pp.
31-220. The conditions
under which there is a duty to perform an action contributing to
the coming about of goods the absence of which is not an evil -
designated there as “action taking care of an evil” - are explained
in “4. The extent of one’s duty to take care of evils,” pp. 181-199.
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T: No, there is no duty. But why do you say, “if all that
I observe”?
F: I do not have a duty to give you the money for a trip
to Austria when the next vacation comes up for both
of you, do I?
T: No, of course not!
F: But suppose I were to promise to finance that trip, and
you accept the promise? Would that not make me
duty bound to give you the money?
T: Yes, then, you would be duty bound.
F: That’s the reason for me having said, “if all that I ob-
serve.” There may be external factors making it ob-
ligatory to bring about a good the absence of which
is not an evil, such as a promise; but - to repeat
what I said before - if all that I observe is that I can
bring about a good the absence of which is not an
evil, acting may be morally commendable, is, how-
ever, not obligatory.
To make sure that we do not generalize hastily, let’s
look at an example of a good even much higher than
a trip to Austria: After your birth, Deb, could your
mother still have had additional children?
D: She was not too old for it yet.
F: Then, for all you know, your parents may even have
considered to have another child, but decided against
it. Had they had another child, they would have
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brought about a great good the absence of which is
not an evil, as we saw before. Did they, however,
violate a duty by not having a sixth child?
D: Raising five children was enough work for them - no,
they did not violate an obligation. They had no duty
to have a sixth child.
T: Do you agree, Fritz?
F: Yes, of course. Remember: Unless there are external
factors - such as a promise - there is no duty to
contribute to the coming about of a good the absence
of which is not an evil; there is only what I call an
“invitation” to do so.
T: Interesting. It seems that all we have discussed so far
supports our view on birth control.
F: Just wait. Here is another example: Suppose a wealthy
man visits a family - the father works as an auto
mechanic - and is deeply impressed with their daugh-
ter’s intelligence. During the conversation, he finds
out that she will graduate from high school at the
end of the current schoolyear.
“What college will
she attend?” he asks. They respond that the fam-
ily cannot afford sending her to college, that they
need a secretary for their shop, and that she will
work there after school is over. She indicates that
she is looking forward to assisting her dad. Later
that day, in his hotel room, the wealthy man asks
himself whether he should offer to finance the young
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woman’s college education, and to suggest that she
apply to first-rate colleges as soon as possible. Is he
under an obligation to do so?
T: No, of course not; this is another case of providing a
good the absence of which is not an evil. As we have
seen before, there is no duty to perform such actions.
F: Suppose just before going to bed, he decides that he
will make this offer and to call the auto mechanic’s
family in the morning. After getting up, he is about
to pick up the phone - but then, he has second
thoughts about the matter. Would it be allowed
for him to change his mind?
T: Of course; he has not made a commitment yet, and
no one except for him even knows that he has con-
sidered making this offer.
F: Now allow me to come into the picture. Assume that
the wealthy man has not changed his mind, and that
I meet him for breakfast in the hotel prior to him
having made the telephone call to the family. He
tells me that every year, he sets a big amount of
money aside for a good work, and that this year, it
is financing a gifted young lady’s higher education.
He also tells me that he will call the family after
breakfast. Let me add that he feels deeply in my
debt because I have saved his life at an earlier oc-
casion (before you express your admiration for me,
remember that that whole story is made up on the
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spot). So I have good reasons to assume that he
will go along with my wishes, and I suggest that he
use the money for a different purpose. Is this mor-
ally acceptable? Would you say “yes,” “no,” or “it
depends”?
T: I think I’d say, “It depends.”
F: And what does it depend on?
T: What you suggest he do with the money instead of
financing the young lady’s college education.
F: Suppose I call his attention to another young very gif-
ted high school graduate whose parents cannot af-
ford sending her to college and suggest that he spend
the money for her instead of for the auto mechanic’s
daughter. Would this be OK?
T: In view of the fact that he has made no commitment
and that the auto mechanic’s family does not even
know that he is considering donating the money,
your attempt to persuade him to use the funds for
someone else’s higher education seems fine.
F: Suppose I call attention to the fact that one of my
acquaintances needs a very expensive medical treat-
ment which his family cannot afford, that the funds
he would have to set aside for the college education
would cover it, and try to persuade him to use the
money for that purpose?
T: That also seems OK.
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F: But suppose I try my best to persuade him to give
the money to me so that I can go to Las Vegas to
gamble.
T: You want him to do that instead of financing the wo-
man’s higher education?
F: Precisely.
T: That strikes me as wrong. What do you think, Deb?
D: I agree.
T: I did not know that you are a gambler, Fritz.
F: Whatever gambling I do does not take place in Las
Vegas, and it is not literal gambling. But let’s see
what the results of my last dice throw are.
Persuading the wealthy man to use the money set
aside for the young woman’s college education for
a different purpose is an action interfering with the
coming about of a good the absence of which is not
an evil, is it not?
T: Yes, that sounds right.
F: And as the examples we went over show, such an ac-
tion is not always morally acceptable. There are two
things one must compare to determine the accept-
ability of such an action. What are they?
T: We must compare the good the coming about of which
is prevented with the purpose of the interfering ac-
tion.
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F: And if that purpose is of equal or greater importance
compared to the good interfered with - as is the
case when one person’s higher education is compared
with the higher education of an equally gifted person
or with the medical treatment of someone who is
desperately ill - carrying the interfering action out
seems appropriate.
T: Agreed.
F: If, however, the purpose of the interfering action is of
lesser significance than the good interfered with - as
is the case when the young woman’s higher educa-
tion is compared with my enjoying myself gambling
in Las Vegas - the interfering action is wrong. Yes
or no?
T: Yes.
F: Now tell me: Does not artificial birth control involve an
action interfering with the coming about of a good
the absence of which is not an evil?
- Tom? - It
seems as if he does not want to answer the question;
so what do you think, Deb?
D: Yes, it seems to be that kind of an action.
F: What is the good the coming about is interfered with?
D: A human person.
F: That is, a very precious, very valuable, very high good.
And aren’t actions interfering with the coming about
of a good the absence of which is not an evil justified
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only if they are carried out for a purpose at least as
significant as the good interfered with?
D: That’s what we seem to have seen before.
F: How easy is it to think of a purpose of the interfering
action as significant as a human life?
D: It does not seem easy.
F: Is not the good for the sake of which the coming about
a human life is interfered with the immediate enjoy-
ment and happiness which the conjugal act brings
about (I say “immediate,” for if one were to prac-
tice natural birth regulation, that enjoyment would
only be postponed by several days at the most rather
than eliminated)?
D. It seems so.
F: Thus, the good the coming abut is interfered with is a
human person; the good intended by the interfering
action is worry-free sex, if you allow me to formu-
late it that blandly. What ranks higher, the good
intended, or the good interfered with?
D: Obviously the good interfered with.
F: Given what we have seen before, does this not show
the interfering action to be morally wrong? - Both
of you seem to be reluctant to respond; so allow me
to summarize: We have seen that there are actions
contributing to the coming about of goods the ab-
sence of which is not an evil; we have also seen that
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there are actions interfering with the coming about
of a good the absence is not an evil. With regard to
the first type of action, we saw that, unless there is
an “outside” source of an obligation (such as a prom-
ise), there is never a duty, but only an invitation to
carry the action out. With regard to actions inter-
fering with the coming about of goods the absence
of which is not an evil we have, however, seen that
there is a duty to omit these action if the purpose
for which the action is performed does not meas-
ure up in significance to that of the good interfered
with. This shows that artificial birth control morally
questionable, to say the least.
How about natural family planning, though? Is in
that case, the decisive step doing something or not
doing something? Tom?
T: It’s not doing something - abstaining from intercourse.
F: Is this performing an action interfering with the com-
ing about of a good the absence of which is not an
evil, or omitting an action which might bring about
a good the absence of which is not an evil?
T: Obviously the second.
F: And have we not determined that, barring the presence
of outside sources of duties, there is never an obliga-
tion, but always only an invitation to perform such
actions? Does it not seem now that the difference
between artificial birth control and natural family
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planning is not just like the difference between you
walking into my room from the direction of the sec-
retary’s office as opposed to from the other direc-
tion? Tom?
T: At this point, I cannot think of a reply but. . . but. . .
F: I
suppose you want to add, “But something might
come to my mind.” There is nothing wrong with
carefully considering the arguments we went over.
Actually, maybe at this point, I can help you out
with a counterargument one of my students used in
the past when I got to this point of the conversa-
tion: The purpose of an action interfering with the
coming about of a good the absence of which is not
an evil can either be bringing about another good
the absence of which is not an evil, or preventing,
alleviating, or removing an evil. The first applies to
persuading the wealthy man to finance the college
education of another deserving high school gradu-
ate rather than that of the auto mechanic’s daugh-
ter; the second applies to the case of persuading the
wealthy man to finance the medical treatment of the
seriously ill person rather than sending someone to
college.
My conversation partner said that, if two goods are
at stake the absence of which is not an evil, the in-
terfering action would be allowed only if the good for
the sake of which the interfering action is performed
is of equal or higher value compared to that of the
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good interfered with. He said that for this reason,
trying to persuade the wealthy man to give me the
money set aside for the young lady’s college educa-
tion so that I can buy a Van Gogh original to hang
in my living room would be morally questionable.
He continued, however, by pointing out that from
the point of view of significance, it is difficult to
compare goods the absence of which is not an evil
with evils, and took the position that, if the goal
of the interfering action is the prevention of an evil,
the action is allowed, at least if the evil to be pre-
vented can be designated as significant. Thus, he
took the position that artificial birth control is ac-
ceptable whenever its purpose is to prevent a serious
difficulty that would be connected with childbirth -
and he said that this applies to almost all cases. How
does that strike you?
T: I am not sold on the statement that there are any cases
in which artificial birth control is unacceptable while
natural family planning is acceptable, and I hope
that I will come up with arguments showing that
both always are equivalent; but it seems that, given
what your conversation partner has said, even you
must agree that artificial birth control is acceptable
if the birth of a child would be connected with diffi-
culties, such as if a poverty stricken family must care
for three children already, if both husband and wife
must work to earn a living for their family, and if the
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wife’s workplace does not allow maternity leave, or
if an additional pregnancy would mean health risks
for the woman.
F: Would not in all these cases natural family planning
also reach the desired goal?
T: True, but remember how your conversation partner
straightened you out - if I am permitted to use this
language: At least in cases in which the birth of a
child involves serious difficulties, artificial birth con-
trol is allowed. Does that not clearly follow from
what he said? I doubt that you were able to respond
to his argument.
F: Suppose after my retirement, I live in a little town in
Maine, about five miles distant from the Appalachian
Trail. Early Friday morning, a friend comes by my
house, tells me that over the weekend, he will walk
on the trail together with some other friends and
asks me to come along. “We would pick you up in
about an hour and drive to a parking lot from which
we have access to the trail.” I agree, and he states.
“Be sure to pack warm clothes. You know that the
weather can change very quickly up there. You prob-
ably have read in the paper about the six people who
froze to death there during the past three weeks.”
As soon as he leaves, I remember that all my warm
clothes are at the cleaner. So I go to my next-door
neighbor’s house to borrow clothes - he is pretty
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exactly my size. He is not home, and I remember
that he is out of town over the weekend. I break
into his house; in one of his closets, I find what I
need, and I take it. The weather turns out such that
without the warm clothes, I truly would be in very
bad shape (and my friends would not have taken me
along anyway). After the hike, my friends drop me
of at my house. A little later, I walk over to my
neighbor’s house and ring the bell. He comes out,
very agitated, and says, “While I was gone, someone
broke into my house and stole some of my clothes.
Did you see anything?” I reply, “Yes. I needed your
clothes. Here they are.” I hand him a bag. He
looks into it and sees his clothes; then he looks at
me. “What? You broke into my house?” I reply, “I
needed the clothes because otherwise, I would have
probably frozen to death during the weekend hike I
took with my friends up on the Appalachian Trail.”
Very much to my surprise, he keeps on being upset
and says that he would report me to the police right
away.
T: What do you mean, “very much to my surprise”? Noth-
ing forced you to go on the hike; you could easily
have stayed home.
F: So you would not buy the justification I gave for having
broken into his house?
T: Of course not! It might have been different if you
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had needed the clothes to participate in a rescue
operation - and then, your next-door neighbor might
have forgiven you; it might even have been different,
had your friends forced you to go along; but neither
of that was the case.
F: Let’s examine the example. It involves two different
actions. One is going on the hike. To make sure
that this first action does not have any negative con-
sequences, a second action is necessary. What is it?
T: Breaking into your next-door neighbor’s house and
taking the clothes without his permission.
F: What is the purpose of this second action?
T: To make sure that you don’t freeze to death on your
hike.
F: And what is the purpose of the first action?
T: To enjoy a weekend on the Appalachian Trail.
F: This first action - freely carried out by me without any
need or compulsion - makes the second action neces-
sary to make sure that the first does not have neg-
ative - in that case even disastrous - consequences.
What strikes you as more correct with regard to the
second action: “I took the clothes to enjoy a week-
end on the Appalachian Trail,” or “I took the clothes
in order not to freeze to death”?
T: There is a sense in which both apply - but the first
seems to be more relevant; otherwise, your next-door
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neighbor’s continuing to be upset would not be jus-
tified.
F: This teaches us the following: Suppose there are two
actions. The first one could be easily omitted without
serious negative consequences; but to perform it without
negative consequences, a second action is required.
In those cases, a moral justification of the second
action is not to be given in terms of the goal of the
second action, but in terms of the goal of the first.
Agreed?
T: It sounds a bit complicated; but I think I got it. How
about you, Deb?
D: I think I got it, too; and it seems to be supported by
the example.
F: So tell me, what are the two actions involved in arti-
ficial birth control? What is the first action which
makes performing of the second necessary?
T: Sexual intercourse.
F: The conjugal act. And what is the second action?
T: Whatever is done to prevent conception - such as using
a diaphragm, a condom, or both, preferably together
with spermicides.
F: What is the objective of the second action?
T: To prevent pregnancy.
F: In other words, to prevent the coming about of a highly
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precious good the absence of which is not an evil.
And what is the immediate goal of the first action
which, as you say, makes the second necessary?
T: The enjoyment and happiness brought about by the
conjugal act.
F: Let me add - to account for what natural family plan-
ning would involve - that enjoyment and happiness
right now rather than a few days later. Remem-
ber: A moral evaluation of the second action must
be given in terms of the immediate goal of the first
action which makes the second action necessary, as
you say. The first brings about a good the absence
of which is not an evil - the immediate enjoyment
and happiness engendered by the conjugal act. The
second interferes with the coming about of a great, a
precious good. If you compare the significance of the
good the coming about of which the second action
prevents with the significance of the good the first
action brings about, which one ranks higher? Tom?
T: I am thinking about this whole argument - there must
be some flaw in it.
F: Deb, are you willing to answer my question?
T: As stated before, a human person ranks higher than
the enjoyment and happiness brought about by the
conjugal act.
F: Given that, if two actions are connected in the way
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described earlier, the second must be evaluated in
light of the immediate goal of the first, don’t we have
to say that artificial birth control interferes with the
coming about of a high good for the sake of a lesser
good even if it takes place in a situation in which a
pregnancy would be difficult? And did we not see
earlier that this is morally not acceptable?
D: Honestly, I do not know what to say.
T: Maybe we can come up with something if we think
about it some more. A first item to mention is that
refraining from intercourse has exactly the same out-
come.
F: Remember that considering the outcome of human con-
duct is not sufficient for its proper moral evaluation.
And besides, abstaining from the conjugal act is
omitting an action which could bring about a good
the absence of which is not an evil; recall that, un-
less there are external factors making such actions
obligatory, there is, in an individual case, never a
duty, but only an invitation, to perform them.
I know that both of you are still more than hesitant
to go along with my arguments. The moral consid-
erations we went over are, of course, much more im-
portant than all other arguments - if they are sound,
they are the chief reason why artificial birth control
is to be avoided. There are, however, still additional
considerations in support of natural family planning.
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T: Such as?
F: Besides the conjugal act, there are many other ways in
which husband and wife can and should express their
love for each other, including physically. Something
important is missing from a marriage if these other
ways are absent. Even the conjugal act is such that
one ought not just to “jump” into it; but it should be
preceded and followed by other ways of expressing
one’s tenderness and love to each other physically. Is
it now not much more likely that these alternative
expressions of physical tenderness are present among
marriage partners who must regularly go through
relatively short periods during which they must ab-
stain from the conjugal act rather than among mar-
riage partners to whom the conjugal act is available
“on command,” whenever they want to? The first
applies to couples who practice natural birth regu-
lation; the second applies to those who practice ar-
tificial birth control. How do these thoughts strike
you? Deb? Didn’t you major in psychology?
D: It seems to make sense.
F: Here is another comparison: Think of a person who
is served his favorite meal - fried duck - for two
months every evening as opposed to someone who
has a chance to eat it once approximately every ten
days. What do you think the first one’s reaction will
be?
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T: I like fried duck; but after a couple of weeks, I’d be
sick of it.
F: So as the second person, you would enjoy it much more.
Even though the conjugal act is something signi-
ficantly different from enjoying food, the example
still can teach us an important lesson: First, we are
not speaking about the conjugal act “approximately
once every ten days.” We are speaking about ab-
staining from it for a couple of days in regular inter-
vals. Might this not, in addition to teaching you to
use alternative ways of expressing your love through
alternative ways of physical tenderness, give you a
greater appreciation of the conjugal act when you
can resume it, similarly as you, Tom, will enjoy fried
duck more after not having had it for some time?
You are married for only about two month; so what
I am going to say next does not yet apply to you.
It might, however, start applying in five, ten, fif-
teen years. Listen to what Dietrich von Hildebrand
writes in the book I offered to lend you: “Temporary
abstinence is a psychological aid against the spiritu-
ally dulling power of habit.”7
There are couples for
whom the conjugal act takes only a couple of minutes
and is neither preceded nor followed by other ex-
pressions of physical tenderness. Compare mentally
what they experience in contrast to what you exper-
ience now when you give yourselves to each other in
7Hildebrand, Love, Marriage, and the Catholic Conscience, p. 66
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the conjugal act. You probably do not wish to wind
up in the situation of the couple I just referred to.
As you will see in the not-to-distant future, avoid-
ing this situation requires conscious and continu-
ous effort; and for the psychological reasons given
before, natural family planning might be a great
help in these efforts. Finally, let me mention that,
while, of course, abstaining from the conjugal act
is a sacrifice, Dietrich von Hildebrand states, “We
are. . . speaking. . . of married couples who are called
to make this sacrifice for a few days. . . The difficulty
of periodic abstinence is often greatly exaggerated:
how many people, for example, are ready to under-
take temporary abstinence for professional reasons
such as prolonged journeys?”8
Does he not have a
point?
T: Well, all of this would be much less unsettling if the
assumption on which you seem to have based all you
said in this discussion would be true: That there
are reliable methods of natural birth regulation. I
have heard, however, that natural birth regulation
is quite ineffective, and that unplanned pregnancies
result from it quite frequently. Besides, Deb and I
would not even know how to go about natural birth
regulation.
F: What you said about the effective of natural methods
8Ibid.
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is often repeated, but I can assure you that it is not
correct. Putting abortifacients to the side - remem-
ber that even the so-called “pill” occasionally works
by preventing the implantation of a fertilized ovum,
falls, therefore, under your minister’s condemnation
- putting them to the side, natural birth regula-
tion compares very favorably to methods of artificial
birth control. With regard to how it works, much in-
formation is available on the Internet. Here, on that
piece of paper, you see the URL of an Internet site.
It leads you to a webpage explaining natural family
planning in great detail.9
There are still two additional points I would like to
bring up. First, I claim that I have presented sound
arguments demonstrating that natural family plan-
ning is morally acceptable, while artificial birth con-
trol is not. I know that you are hesitant to go along
with my claim. . .
T: You can say that again!
F: . . . However, did you hear me use any religious argu-
ments, such as an appeal to a teaching of the Bible or
to an authoritative teaching of the Catholic Church,
or did I not limit myself to considerations of which I
think that human reason can understand them apart
from revelation?
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T: You appealed only to our reason, and I can assure you
that my reason will try to do its best to come up
with counterarguments.
F: Suppose, however, that there are no sound counter-
arguments, and that my arguments stand. Would
that not mean that the Evangelical denomination
you belong to would officially permit conduct that
is morally wrong, while the Church of which I am a
member would correctly designate that conduct as
morally unacceptable?
T: Correct, if there are no sound counterarguments, which
I consider more than a big “if.”
F: And would this not be a strong argument in favor of
the denomination your pastor argued against when
preparing you, Tom, for baptism, and the both of
you for marriage?
T: If there are no sound counterarguments. But remem-
ber. . .
F: . . . I know, the big “if.” Allow me to turn to the second
of the two points. While there would, of course, be
many points of disagreements between your pastor
and me if we ever were to meet for a discussion,
there would, also be many points we would agree on
- such as there were many points Deb and I agreed
on when we “ganged up” on you, Tom, during our
conversations more than two years ago. One thing
I particularly appreciate is his objection to aborti-
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facients - unfortunately, there are Christian denom-
inations which would not go along with him in this
respect. The second point is the way he applies the
words of Gn 1.29 “be fruitful and multiply” - to mar-
riage: Remember what I said with regard to actions
bringing about a good the absence of which is not an
evil: If all I observe is that I can bring such a good
into existence, there is no duty, but only an invita-
tion for me to act. There may, however, be external
factors (I used a promise as example) which might
make performing such actions obligatory. With your
minister, I am now saying that people who place
themselves into a Christian marriage fall under the
“be fruitful and multiply” command of God, and are
obligated to bring children into the world; not more,
of course, than they can be reasonably expected to
take care of. Thus, although natural family plan-
ning is morally acceptable, it would not be morally
acceptable for a married couple to practice it during
the entire duration of their marriage. It is, of course,
up to them when to have children. And as you said
before, you intend to have children.
D: Yes, we do.
F: To make sure that there is no misunderstanding: Un-
like any of the arguments I presented earlier, the
second of the two final points I made included a re-
ligious argument.
But now, that it has come to be evening, I am think-
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ing about an action bringing about a good the ab-
sence of which is not an evil: How about me inviting
both of you for dinner at the new restaurant across
the street? I have heard excellent things about it;
the food is supposed to be really outstanding.
T: I have heard that it is on the expensive side.
F: You would not have to worry about this - me inviting
you means that I would pay. Do you want to come?
D: It is very, very kind of you to invite us.
F: So you want to come?
D + T: Yes, we do! Thank you very, very much.
With that, we got up and left my office; I locked it, and
we went across the street. . .
